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1 Introduction
Research shows regularly that a significant share of the gender pay gap relates
to women being concentrated in less-paying occupations than men. However,
occupational segregation is not the only form of segregation contributing to
the difference between male and female wages. For example, in many coun-
tries a large proportion of the employed labour force is covered by collective
labour agreements providing and synchronising a common framework for re-
muneration, working time and other basic terms of employment for all work-
ers under the same collective agreement. And yet a mainstream approach
rarely attempts to separate the share of the overall pay gap due to occu-
pational segregation from the one owing to women’s segregation into lower
paying collective agreements. Maybe even a still more serious deficiency is to
ignore cross-sectional heterogeneity in workers’ returns to their endowments
resulting from the fact that workers are distributed between various collective
labour agreements (abbr. CLA).
These shortcomings may reverberate in several ways. First, the effects
of the different types of segregation may easily be mixed with each other.
Second, ignoring cross-sectional heterogeneity (being manifested in parame-
ter heterogeneity in practise) may produce imprecise or downright fallacious
parameter estimates which, consequently, lead to misdirected policy recom-
mendations. As a result it will be impossible to conclude assertively whether
it is occupational segregation or rather the entire system of collective agree-
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ments that needs closer attention in order to reduce the wage gap. Hence
without making a clear distinction between types of segregation and identi-
fying correctly their importance vis-a´-vis the wage gap it might happen that
even a successful campaign of reducing occupational segregation would fail
to decrease the gap proportionally if a significant share of it were in fact due
to women being under-represented in higher-paying collective agreements.
In this paper we first present and then also empirically apply an alterna-
tive approach to overcome these shortcomings by first dividing the employed
work force into separate groups according to collective agreements and esti-
mating then wage regressions separately for both sexes within each group. In
this way we can have a better grasp of heterogeneity and types of segregation
affecting the wage gap, especially, in a labour market characterized by col-
lective agreements and occupational segregation. Finally, the index theory
offers the necessary means for aggregation of micro-level CLA-specific wage
gap decompositions together on aggregate level.
The main empirical objects of the current study are to quantify how segre-
gation affects the gender pay gap and how this has possibly changed between
1995 and 2004 in Finland. This time span of ten years is of extra interest for
us since it coincides with a period of recovery in Finland after an economic
recession of historical dimensions during the first years of the 1990’s when
unemployment rate increased in a couple of years by over ten percentage
points. Thus the recovery period forms a coherent time span for studying
whether the forms and types of segregation have remained unaltered even
after the recession which otherwise entailed even many fairly fundamental
changes for the structure of the whole Finnish economy, for example, by ac-
celerating the intergenerational transformation of the labour force structure.
On the other hand, by the time of writing this paper the data sets being fit
for the econometric use covered precisely the ten year period 1995-2004 only.
Especially, concerning the types of segregation at issue we will focus in
more detail on trying to quantify empirically the shares of the overall gender
wage gap arising from:
1. occupational segregation,
2. firm segregation and
3. collective labour agreement segregation.
In what follows, we present first an overview of literature on the relation-
ship between segregation and the gender wage gap. We discuss also the need
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for enhancing the analysis by more detailed distinction of various types of
segregation from each other and by taking account of heterogeneity in wage-
setting arising from men and women being distributed differently across col-
lective agreements in a labour market characterised by collective bargaining.
After that we introduce our approach capturing cross-sectional heterogene-
ity in wage setting due to various collective agreements and offering a way
to aggregate micro-level wage gaps into sectoral-level decompositions. Then
follows the empirical analysis. And finally a conclusive discussion about the
results and the methodological approach ends the study.
2 Previous research, types of segregation and
cross-sectional heterogeneity across collec-
tive labour agreements
A wide literature has emerged during the last decennia on gender segregation
and its wage gap effects. Various forms of segregation have been taken up
in these studies. A major landmark was Groshen (1991) who in her seminal
study disentangled segregation by occupation from that based on employer
or on job-cell (i.e. the interaction between occupation and establishment).
According to her results, the proportion of females in an occupation explains
the largest proportion of the gender wage gap. Instead gender wage differ-
entials arising within job-cells turned out be negligible.
Afterwards Groshen’s approach has been replicated with minor modi-
fications for the U.S. as well as for a number of other countries. Using
micro-data for the U.S Bayard et al. (2003) found that occupational segre-
gation accounts for a large portion of pay gap among full-time employees.
In contrast to Groshen, however, they observed significant gender wage dif-
ferentials within job-cells too. Groshen’s approach has also been replicated
in Nordic countries. Using Danish data Gupta & Rothstein (2005) found
significant within-job-cell differentials. Korkeama¨ki & Kyyra¨ (2005) provide
evidence that in the Finnish manufacturing sector the aggregate effect of
segregation of women and men into different industries, occupations, firms
and job cells (occupation-firm combinations) explain some 50-60 per cent
of the gender wage gap. Among blue-collar workers each dimension of sex
segregation seems equally important while among white-collar workers the
segregation effect works entirely through occupation and job cell segrega-
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tion. Finally, Arai et al. (2004), in order to avoid multi-collinearity between
various types of proportion females, excluded job cells completely from the
analysis and found after having compared female proportions of occupations
and establishments with each other the first mentioned explaining clearly a
larger fraction of the overall gender pay gap among Swedish private sector
employees in 1995.
Thus even a short review of earlier research proves of remarkable complex-
ity and ambiguity in mechanisms and processes generating pay differentials
between men and women. In fact, one can hardly capture multitude of de-
tails of the segregation phenomenon in one study only. This explains also
why our approach differs from that of Groshen’s in certain aspects. For
example, we do not analyse the job-cell dimension but instead concentrate
on analysing pay gap effects of gender segregation along occupational and
firm/establishment dimensions in more detail.1 In this way we hope to add
on to earlier studies by emphasising certain points not being thoroughly scru-
tinised so far. We continue by discussing how and why our approach differs
from previous studies.
The definition of segregation is a natural starting point, not least because
the very concept is surprisingly often fairly loosely defined in many papers.
Since Groshen’s seminal paper researchers often strive for capturing segrega-
tion by including the proportions of females in branch, firm/establishment,
occupation and job-cells in estimation equations.2 This is a convenient so-
lution at least for two reasons. Firstly, proportion female is a continuous
variable compressing an otherwise huge number of indicator variables (espe-
cially, number of job-cell dummies, being the inner product of numbers of
occupations and firms (or even establishments), grows fast). Furthermore,
empirical evidence supports the inclusion of proportion female as there ex-
ists fairly comprehensive empirical documentation of an adverse relationship
between proportion of females in firms/establishments/occupations/job-cells
and the corresponding mean wage.
1According to Korkeama¨ki & Kyyra¨ (2005) only a minor part of raw wage differentials
originates from within job-cells. Furthermore, as there is empirical evidence of people
often working in job-cells being highly dominated by one or the other sex, even the option
of specifying the corresponding proportion female as continuous is debatable (the last
mentioned issue will be discussed in more detail later in the current paper).
2Formally, proportion females can be defined as FjNj where Fj denotes number of
women and Nj number of men and women belonging to labour structure j (branch,
firm/establishment, occupation or job-cell etc.).
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However, there are still some remaining questions concerning the use of
proportion of females as a measure of gender segregation. Firstly, it is unsure
whether the relation between female proportion and (log) wages is linear as
it is usually specified. Secondly, as Arai et al. (2004) have already demon-
strated empirically, inclusion of proportions of females as explanatory vari-
ables in wage model leads to obvious multi-collinearity problem.3 Thirdly,
the overall distribution of female proportions depends on women’s labour
force participation rate potentially restricting the range of values proportion
females may take and simultaneously also invalidating international compar-
isons. On the basis of these considerations we will opt for an alternative
model specification by using indicator variables in specifying firm and occu-
pation effects and thus bypassing the linearity assumption as well as potential
multi-collinearity problems.
While in studies of the gender wage gap a lot of effort has been put to
include exhaustively all the observed wage-determining factors and even to
account for heterogeneity due to unobserved factors as well, it seems that
the issue of potential heterogeneity in returns to observed factors across dif-
ferent segments of labour force has not attracted equivalent attention by
researchers as yet. Still, one can easily name potential sources for parame-
ter heterogeneity, such as, idiosyncratic differentials in wage determination
among firms or collective agreements. Thus in this study, instead of trying
to capture all observed and unobserved wage-determining factors as compre-
hensively as possible, we turn the focus on the potential and this far largely
unexplored heterogeneity resulting from differences in returns to conventional
wage-determining factors (age, education, occupation etc.) generating dis-
parate effects on the gender wage gap across subgroups of workers under
various collective agreements.
A central justification for the choice of collective agreements as a key
source of intra-labour market heterogeneity in the current paper are the
strong status and the long traditions of centralised collective agreements be-
tween the employers’ and employees’ labour market organisations within the
Finnish labour market system. The regulation of the labour market in Fin-
land is based on labour legislation and, primarily, on collective agreements
3Arai et al. (2004) report a cross correlation estimate of 0.77 between proportion females
of occupations and job-cells for Swedish private sector employees in 1995. Furthermore,
Korkeama¨ki & Kyyra¨ (2005) report cross correlations between proportion females of occu-
pations and job-cells being 0.85 and 0.74 for Finnish white-collar and blue-collar workers
respectively.
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setting the minimum terms and conditions of the central features of any
employment relation, such as, wages and labour hours. However, collective
agreements determine only the minimum of wage level and increases an em-
ployer is obliged to pay while it is entirely up to the firm to pay more than
that if so required (e.g. due to excess demand of a certain type of labour,
efficiency wage considerations etc.). This phenomenon being called ”wage
drift” is familiar from all labour markets covered by collective agreements.
Any trade union and employers association may make collective agree-
ments. Nearly all collective agreements are branch-specific and usually blue-
collar and white-collar workers belong under different agreements even within
the same branch. Finally, a further potential sorting factor for many agree-
ments is formed by occupational sub-groups nearest corresponding to ISCO-
88(COM)4 1-digit levels (typically levels 2,3 and 4 entering separately and
levels 5-9 more often as a common group while level 1 ”legislators, senior
officials and managers” usually do not belong to any collective agreements
having instead individual employment contracts of their own).
Indeed, much of the existing literature on segregation ignores collective
agreements even though these clearly form a potential source of heterogene-
ity in any labour market where collective bargaining takes place. And even
if not completely ignored the whole complexity of heterogeneous collective
agreements is often approached by merely adding a dummy variable for in-
dustry into a wage regression. Still, heterogeneity goes much deeper than
that, mechanisms determining individual wages being reflected through the
agreement-specific regression coefficients. I.e., wage determination varies
from agreement to agreement and in order to capture this diversity and, es-
pecially, in order to prevent its pay gap effects erroneously being mingled
with corresponding segregation effects, regression coefficients need to be es-
timated separately for each collective agreement.
Admittedly, our approach may appear somewhat unconventional in the
present context. However, there is an extensive literature (under the col-
lective title ”hedonic methods”) on the methods being applied in this study
based on index theory and having often direct linkages to NSI s (national
statistical institutes). Indeed, most of the empirical applications in the area
have been developed and applied by NSIs (especially in the field of consumer
price indexes).
4ISCO-88(COM) is the European Union variant of the International Standard Classi-
fication of Occupations (ISCO-88).
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3 Methodological description: the Collective
Labour Agreement Classification Method
We continue by presenting our statistical approach (henceforth, the collective
labour agreement classification method) in more detail. The first step is to
define estimated wage equations in semi-logarithmic form as follows
lnW sceoi = αˆ
s
c + βˆ
sT
c x
s
ceoi +
Ec∑
e=2
γˆsceD FIRMei +
Oc∑
o=2
δˆscoD OCCoi + ²ˆ
s
ceoi (1)
where ”hat”ˆdenotes (OLS) parameter estimate. lnW sceoi is a logarithmic
wage of person i of male (superscript s=m) or female (superscript s=f ) gen-
der being covered by a collective labour agreement c, working in employer
firm e and occupation o. xsceoi is a vector consisting of the K observable
variables denoting individual i ’s own or his/her employer firm’s (e) charac-
teristics (potentially containing both continuous and indicator variables) and
βs
T
c is a transpose vector of the K corresponding coefficients. D FIRM and
D OCC are indicator variables being equal to one for firm and occupation
in which person i works, otherwise they are equal to zero.
A few focal issues need to be highlighted in order to clarify our approach.
Firstly, note the subscript c denoting collective labour agreement (CLA)
under which the worker belongs. There are C different CLAs each forming
a separate estimation cell. I.e we will divide workers according to collective
agreements they belong to and estimate for each separate group of men vs.
women under a given CLA a separate wage equation. All in all, as each
gender will be estimated separately there will be 2*C separately estimated
wage equations in the analysis.
Secondly, the estimated model will remain identically specified across the
2*C separate estimations. Of course, firm and occupation indicators need
to be adjusted to correspond to the CLA in question (the indicator variables
simply being zeros for firms and/or occupations not being represented under
the collective agreement in question) but otherwise all the explanatory vari-
ables as well as the model specification will remain the same across all the
estimations.
Thirdly, even though the set of explanatory variables will remain basi-
cally the same in each estimation, all the coefficient estimates (αˆsc, βˆ
s
c , γˆ
s
ce,
and δˆsco) will vary across collective agreements (and separately for men and
7
women) reflecting the heterogeneity in wage setting across CLAs. Especially,
take here notice of the estimated γˆsce coefficients capturing firm effects. These
coefficients being estimated for each collective agreement (c) separately im-
plicates that, though referring to the firm-level effects in the first place, they
capture even establishment-/local unit-specific within-firm effects when the
firm consists of two or more local units each operating within a different
industry/branch and simultaneously under a different collective agreement.
And of course, in the case of a single-unit firm the corresponding coefficients
catch firm and establishment/local unit effects simultaneously. For unambi-
guity, we will talk about ”firm effects” even when referring to a multi-unit
multi-branch firm.5
After having estimated 2*C separate otherwise identical wage equations
we can form a standard Oaxaca-type wage gap decomposition6 for each col-
lective agreement c as follows:
ln
{
Wmc
W fc
}
=
(
αˆmc − αˆfc
)
+ βˆm
T
c
(
x¯mc − x¯fc
)
+
(
βˆmc − βˆfc
)T
x¯fc+
Ec∑
e=2
γˆmce
(
D FIRM
m
ce −D FIRM fce
)
+
Ec∑
e=2
(
γˆmce − γˆfce
)
D FIRM
f
ce+
Oc∑
o=2
δˆmco
(
D OCC
m
co −D OCCfco
)
+
Oc∑
o=2
(
δˆmco − δˆfco
)
D OCC
f
co,
(2)
where geometric (underline) and arithmetic (bar/overline) means are cal-
culated separately for each combination of gender (s = (f,m)) and collective
5In our use the term ”establishment” refers to a firm’s single physical location where
business transactions take place. Groups of one or more establishments under common
ownership or control are ”firms”. A single-unit firm owns or operates only one establish-
ment. A multi-unit firm owns or operates two or more establishments belonging to the
same or different fields of activities.
6Cf. Oaxaca (1973).
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labour agreements (c = (1, ..., C)).7 Naturally, the total absence of residual
means in the wage gap decomposition 2 results from one of the main statis-
tical properties of OLS estimators that the mean value of the OLS residuals
is zero.
There is nothing extraordinary in the wage gap decomposition 2 in itself.
Instead the main issue is now that there is 2*C distinct sets of regression pa-
rameter estimates each being based on a basically identically specified wage
equation, but being separately estimated for each sub-group of workers across
all combinations of gender and collective agreements. Underlying here is the
fact that in Finland collective labour agreements stipulate all central aspects
of an individual’s labour relationship such as working time and remuneration.
Therefore wage determination when based on collective agreements finds its
empirical counterpart in heterogeneity of regression coefficients across esti-
mation cells (i.e. combinations of sex and collective labour agreements).
The next issue is how to aggregate the CLA-specific decompositions to
aggregate level (the whole Finnish private sector). Here index theory can
be of significant help and the CLA-specific wage gap decompositions can
be aggregated into one overall decomposition using a Laspeyres-type index
framework in which females are equivalent to ”base period” and males to
”comparison period” (following the terminology of time indexes). In practise,
we will adopt the following aggregation solution initially stated by Koev
(2003) and based on the log-Laspeyres index8:
logLaspWmf =
C∑
c=1
W¯ fc N
f
c
W¯ fN f
ln
{
Wmc
W fc
}
, (3)
Thus the aggregation solution is a weighted average across collective
7For example, the arithmetic mean wage for males under a collective agreement c is
lnW
m
c =
∑Nmc
i=1
lnWmci
Nmc
, and the corresponding geometric mean is calculated as follows
Wmc =
[∏Nmc
i=1 Wci
] 1
Nmc where
∏
is multiplication operator. Thus Wmc is a N
m
c th root
of the product of wages of the Nmc men belonging to collective labour agreement c. The
proportion of men having occupation o ∈ (1,..,O) is D OCCmo = N
m
co
Nmc
etc. Note also
that ln
{
Wmc
W fc
}
, i.e. the logarithmic ratio of men’s and women’s geometric mean wages is
equal to lnW
m
c − lnW
f
c , that is the difference of men’s and women’s arithmetic means of
logarithmic wages.
8To our knowledge Koev (2003) was the first to derive and combine an Oaxaca-type
decomposition with an aggregation solution based on index theory.
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agreements consisting of logarithmic relatives of geometric averages of the
female and male wages using CLA-specific shares of women’s aggregate pay-
roll as weights.
Now the logarithmic Laspeyres formula 3 reveals how many log-percent
higher the overall female mean wage would be if women had on average
similar characteristics as men and were remunerated in an exactly similar
fashion as men for any characteristic within each collective agreement, and
yet women’s distribution across agreements still deviated from that of men. A
major novelty now is that in contrast to the traditional approach of having
only one equation and it being estimated for the whole sample in one go
(maybe, at most, separately for both genders) our approach avoids mixing
the gender segregation across collective agreements with occupational and
firm/establishment segregation.
The aggregated wage gap effects of occupational, firm and collective agree-
ment segregation are defined in more detail in table 1 below. Note especially
that the fraction of the overall pay gap due to women being segregated pro-
portionally more often into less paying collective agreements is the residual
between the overall logarithmic pay gap and the log-Laspeyres type aggre-
gation solution of equation 3 above.
[Table 1 about here.]
4 Data and Results
The data source of the study is the Finnish Structure of Earnings Survey
(SES ) data. The data set contains information on individuals’ conditions of
employment (wage/salary components, working time, etc.), personal charac-
teristics (age, occupation, education, etc.) and employer (industry, size, etc.)
across all the sectors of the Finnish Economy.
However, we do not use the whole SES data covering both the private and
the public sectors (municipalities and central government) in our analysis but
instead concentrate on analysing a sub-sample of the private sector consisting
of the employees working in the member firms of the Confederation of Finnish
Industries (EK ). EK collects the basic statistics on wages and salaries for an
annual SES data from its member enterprises. The inquiries generally cover
all the organised employers employing a vast majority of all the employees
in the Finnish private sector. Statistics Finland supplements these data by
added information on employees from certain public registers and data bases.
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Even though SES data has been collected on annual basis since 1995,
we will confine ourselves to two separate annual pay gap studies on cross-
sectional data for years 1995 and 2004 respectively. As already discussed
earlier in the current paper this time span forms a period of recovery in
Finland after an economic recession of historical dimensions during the first
years of the 1990’s. Thus comparing the beginning and the end of the pe-
riod offers a splendid possibility to study how different types of segregation
evolved and whether their effects on the gender pay gap possibly changed be-
tween 1995 and 2004 coinciding with various other changes for the structure
of the Finnish labour markets and for the whole Finnish economy as well,
such as the accelerated intergenerational transformation of the labour force
structure and the increasing role of the electrotechnical industries.
We start the empirical analysis by constructing an estimation classifi-
cation. That means workers are to be grouped into separate estimation
classes/cells so that people whose wages are determined according to same
rules/mechanisms end up within the same class. This does not mean, how-
ever, that each person will be paid exactly the same wage within a given
class. Rather the aim is to group employees in such a way that the impact of
wage determining factors (occupation, education, work experience, etc.) on
individual wage would be of equal magnitude. Thus, for example, a one more
year in work experience should generate an identical (per cent) increase in
earnings for all the persons within the same estimation class. And still within
a same estimation class more skilled or experienced workers could earn more
than their less-educated and/or less experienced colleagues.
In Finland, most of the employment relationships adhere to the sector’s
collective labour agreement which determine such key elements of each em-
ployment relationship as (minimum) wages and working hours in detail. Con-
sequently, collective agreements form a natural starting point when determin-
ing the estimation classification solution. In the Finnish structural earnings
statistics, however, there is no valid information about a worker’s collective
agreement. So first we needed to decide how to distribute individuals be-
tween collective labour agreements, or in case of minor agreements, between
groups of combined homogeneous agreements in order to ensure a statistically
sufficient number of observations for regression estimations.
There are three factors according to which any worker’s potential collec-
tive agreement can be deduced. The first factor is the employer firm’s field of
activity or, in the case of a multi-unit firm operating several establishments,
the corresponding establishment’s field of activity. The second factor is the
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nature of the employment relationship, i.e., whether the employee is hourly
or monthly paid. Eventually, even the person’s profession may serve as a last
decisive factor in determining under what collective agreement she/he will
obey.
In practice, we proceeded by identifying all the private sector collective
agreements in force in 1995 and 2004 respectively. After that we defined the
fields of activities/industries9 and the nature of the employment relationship
(hourly vs. monthly paid) each collective agreement mainly concerns. In ad-
dition, any professions or job/occupational titles mentioned in the application
directive of a collective agreement (such as ”technical staff”, ”management”,
”specialist”, etc.) were taken into account. Thus a preliminary estimation
classification was formed linking each individual worker unambiguously with
a certain collective labour agreement as employer firm’s/establishments’s
field of activity, worker’s nature of the employment relationship and pro-
fession/occupational title served as link variables. Finally, after having dis-
tributed workers according to the preliminary estimation classification, minor
classes were joined together by combining similar fields of businesses or pro-
fessional groups into larger estimation cells in order to ensure statistically
sufficient estimation groups.
After having determined the estimation classification we move on to spec-
ify the form of a wage model to be estimated. We will use the same semi-
logarithmic model as was already stated in equation 1. The approach in
nutshell is to repeatedly estimate the basically identical wage model sep-
arately for 2*C sub-sample combinations of gender and collective labour
agreements.10 The wage concept is the employee’s monthly salary for reg-
ular hours consisting of the basic salary (duty/task-specific monthly pay +
regular personal bonuses (incl. age / length of service allowances)) without
any shift, Sunday and overtime premiums and without any commission or
incentive payments.
In more detail the repeatedly for each CLA-class c estimated model is
specified as follows:
9Fields of activities/industries were defined at 2- or 3-digit level of NACE Rev. 1 classi-
fication (the statistical Nomenclature of economic activities in the European Community).
10Of course, the set of occupations and firms/establishments vary from agreement to
another. Otherwise, though, the model specification remains the same semi-logarithmic
model as stated in equation 1.
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lnRMW sci =αˆ
s
c +
Oc∑
o=2
γˆscoD OCCcoi +
Ec∑
e=2
δˆsceD FIRMcei+
Lc∑
l=2
ηˆsclD EDLEV ELcli + τˆ
s
cD TEMP
s
ci + βˆ
s
c1AGE 16i+
βˆsc1AGE 16
2
i + θˆ
s
cD NOFULLTIMEci + ²ˆ
s
ci,
(4)
where superscript s tells person’s sex (f = female, m = male), subscript
c identifies the estimation class (i.e. collective agreement), i is an personal
identifier, o occupation title11, e refers to company/establishment and l de-
notes educational level.
In more detail the contents of the variables in wage model 4 are listed
below:
• lnRMW sci = Natural logarithm of monthly basic salary in real terms
• D OCCscoi = indicator variable for occupations: =1, when person i ’s
occupation is o (o ∈ {1.2, , Oc}), otherwise =0. Within each collective
agreement the reference group occupation (o=1) has been chosen on
the basis of being as abundant as possible among both genders.
• D FIRM scei = Indicator variable for firms: =1, when person i ’s em-
ployer firm is e (e ∈ {1.2, , Ec}), otherwise =0. Within each collective
agreement the reference group (e=1) consists of one or more minor
firms chosen as to avoid the multi-collinearity trap.
• D EDUCLEV ELscli = Indicator variable for educational levels: =1,
when person i’s educational level is l (l ∈ {1.2, , Lc}), otherwise =0.
Depending on the collective agreement the reference group (l=1) con-
tains the 3-5 lowest educational levels.12
11The occupation classification used here is the Finnish variant of the European Union’s
ISCO-88(COM) classification standard.
12We apply KOL97, i.e., the Finnish variant of ISCED-1997: the International Standard
Classification of Education (ISCED) adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO
at its twenty-ninth session in November 1997. However, while there are seven separate
educational levels (+ one for missing information) in ISCED-1997, KOL97 contains eight
levels (+ one for ”unknown” level).
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• D TEMP sci = Indicator variable for temporary employment relation-
ship: =1, when employment relationship is temporary, otherwise =0.
• AGE 16sci = Person’s age - 16.
• AGE 16sci2 = Person’s age - 16 squared.
• D NOFULLTIMEci = Indicator variable for not working full time:
=1, when less than 150 regular working hours per month, otherwise
=0.
Table 2 contains estimation diagnostics aggregated from having first es-
timated model 4 repeatedly for each CLA class. As a measure of goodness
of fit we report aggregated root mean square errors (RMSE ). Especially in
the case of semi-log specification it is a good measure as the weighted mean
of CLA-specific RMSE s (multiplied by 100) describes approximately how
many percent the untransformed wages deviate from the predicted values on
average.13 A key observation is that the inclusion of part-timers erodes the
regression fit. While female part-timers’ wages vary on average by 22 to 25
% around the predicted values and male part-timers’ wages by 17-18 %, the
full-timers’ wages are much more closely concentrated around the predicted
values, the average deviation being about 13 % for both genders.
Table 2 contains also information on how many different collective labour
agreements (C), firms/establishments (E) and occupations (O) there are for
men and women, respectively, in the sample in each year. The number of
CLAs have increased by ten: 139 in 1995 vs. 149 in 2004. Both genders
are represented in all the existing agreements. The number of firms have
increased clearly over the observation period indicating the corresponding
increase in labour force employed in the private sector. The number of oc-
cupations, instead, has decreased somewhat being connected most probably
13Note that in the case of the collective agreement classification method the weighted
mean of CLA-specific squared Rs is not comparable to a squared R calculated from an
aggregate level regression. The reason for this is seen by looking at the definition of
squared R of a given collective agreement c, i.e. R2c =
∑Nsc
i=1
(̂lnW ci−lnW c)2
(lnWci−lnW c)2
. Wages being
calculated as deviations from CLA-specific means imply that the ”between” variation
in wages due to collective agreements is already being controlled for in contrast to the
conventional aggregate level ”in one go” estimation where wages are being calculated as
deviations from the aggregate mean.
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with updates in the used Finnish variant of the European Union’s ISCO-
88(COM) classification standard of occupations.
The figures in parentheses denote the fraction (percentage) of all the
firms and occupations where women respectively men work that are fully
(100 %) dominated by the gender in question. It seems that over the pe-
riod 1995-2004 the shares of totally gender-segregated enterprises remained
almost unaltered while the shares of totally gender-segregated occupations
even decreased. Thus, if the development of segregation by gender were to
be assessed only by looking at the changes in the one-dimensional shares of
100% male/female firms and occupations over time, one would definitely see
no sign of an increase in occupational or firm segregation by gender over the
period 1995-2004.
[Table 2 about here.]
Furthermore, the numbers of CLA-firm (C*E) and CLA-occupation (C*O)
combinations for both genders are given in Table 2. Now the figures in paren-
theses denote the percentage fractions of all the combinations of firms and
occupations with collective agreements that women respectively men occupy
being fully (100 %) dominated by the gender in question. Note, especially,
that contrary to the picture emerging from the one-dimensional shares of one-
gender enterprises and occupations above gender segregation, as measured
by the shares of 100% male and female CLA-firm and CLA-occupation pairs,
shows now a very clear increase over the same period. Especially, while the
share of one-gender firms stayed roughly between 10 and 20 percent for both
sexes in 1995-2004, the percentages of one-gender dominated CLA-firm pairs
increased from less than 28 % in 1995 to over 50 % in 2004! This means that
the probability of men and women who work within the same enterprise to
be segregated totally by gender under different collective labour agreements
has considerably increased during the ten-year period.
All this illustrates the complexity of the segregation phenomenon: even
though segregation of men and women across firms remained nearby unal-
tered from 1995 to 2004, segregation by gender across collective agreement-
firm pairs grew substantially over the same period. Thus concentrating
merely on one-dimensional segregation (e.g. occupational segregation or firm
segregation) may lead to biased conclusions about how segregated the labour
market in fact is.
Finally, information of Table 2 can be used to calculate the male- vs.
female-specific average numbers of firms per agreement (C∗E
C
), agreements
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per firm (C∗E
E
), occupations per agreement (C∗O
C
) and agreements per occu-
pation (C∗O
O
). The average number of collective agreements per firm increased
from less than two CLAs per firm in 1995 to three in 2004. This develop-
ment highlights ever more the importance of separating gender segregation
across firms from the one due to men and women being distributed differ-
ently across collective agreements. The development seem fairly similar even
when considering how many occupations there are on average per a collective
agreement: while in 1995 an average agreement covered 25-30 occupations,
the average number of occupational titles per CLA almost doubled within the
next ten years ranging between 40-50 occupations per a collective agreement
in 2004.
Table 3 presents gender pay gap decompositions for the Finnish private
sector in the years 1995 and 2004. The calculations are based on the collec-
tive labour agreements classification method (CLAC) presented in Chapter 3
above. Line 1 shows the aggregate pay gap telling how many percent higher
the men’s average wage is compared to women in the private sector during
the corresponding year. The effects of the key determinants on the aggre-
gate pay gap follow on rows 2-6 telling the corresponding factor’s effect as
a percentage of the overall pay gap. Since the choice of whether to include
even part-time workers in pay gap calculations is likely to affect the size of
the aggregate pay gap, we report decompositions both for full-timers alone
and for the combined body of full- and part-timers together.
[Table 3 about here.]
In a nutshell, the overall wage gap consists of four components:
1. Collective agreement segregation, that is, men being proportionally
more often under a better paying collective agreement (line 2).
2. Occupational segregation, that is, within the same collective agree-
ment men proportionally more often in possession of better paying
occupation (line 3).
3. Firm/establishment segregation, that is, within the same collective
agreement men proportionally more often work in a better paying
firm or establishment (line 4).
4. Other factors’ contribution (line 6).
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Thus, percentages on lines 2-4 are summed up as the combined percentage
of all segregation effects on line 5 which added to the percentage due to ”other
effects” (line 6) always sum up to a total of 100 percent (line 7). The ”other
effects” on line 6 in turn consist of:
• Within the same collective agreement men may have a) propor-
tionally higher educational level, b) higher average age (and conse-
quently, longer potential work experience), c) proportionally more of-
ten fixed-term employment relationship and d) proportionally more
often full-time job.
• In addition, the returns to these factors may favour men (however, only
continuous variables’ pay gap effects can be identified separately).
In the joint sample of full- and part-timers the overall gender gap was
25.4 per cent in 1995 increasing to 28.8 per cent by 2004. When consider-
ing the full-timers’ sub-sample the change took the opposite direction from
the 1995 year’s 20.1 percent to 18.2% by 2004. When interpreting these
results we benefit from a ”bonus” of the collective labour agreement clas-
sification approach, namely, the overall gender pay gap can be decomposed
into two parts: one due to men and women being differently distributed
across collective labour agreements (collective labour agreement segregation
on line 2) and another part due to men having potentially higher mean
wages within collective agreements (occupational and establishment segrega-
tion plus other effects on lines 3, 4 and 6). While in 1995 the first mentioned
”CLA-segregation” effect explained about one fourth (24.4 %) of the total
25.4 per cent pay gap for the joint sample (full- and part-timers), by 2004
its explanatory power had risen to over two-fifths (42.7 %). In the case of
the full-timers’ sub-sample CLA-segregation corresponded to a much smaller
fraction of the overall gap: in 1995, the CLA-segregation explained only five
per cent and in 2004, even after showing a clear rise, its explanatory power
was not more than 13.2 per cent as a portion of the overall gap.
Thus, the size of the CLA-segregation effect seems to depend positively
on the share of part-timers in the sample. Bearing in mind that already in
1995 women did more often part-time (13.9% of women vs. 3.8% of men)
and that women’s propensity for part-time work grew proportionally even
more up to 2004 (18.9% of women vs. 5.2% of men) it is close to conclude
that the magnitude and growth of the CLA-segregation effect bears evidence
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of female part-timers ending up proportionally more often under less paying
agreements than their male counterparts. On the other hand, this means
also that the effects of ”part-time segregation” and CLA-segregation mix up
with each other thus potentially overemphasising the role of CLA-segregation
among the background factors. In this case there will be an upward bias in
the estimated effect of CLA-segregation on the overall pay gap. All in all, the
larger proportion of women than men working as part-timers forms a clear
object for further research. The main issue here is whether women’s higher
propensity to do part-time depends on their own preferences or alternatively
indicates of typical female jobs being more often open for part-timers only
as compered to traditional male jobs.
Line 3 presents the partial effects of occupational segregation calculated as
percentage of the overall gap. For full- and part-timers together occupational
segregation accounts for almost one fourth (23.6 %) of the overall gap in
1995 diminishing then below two-fifths (19.1%) in 2004. The diminishing
explanatory power of occupational segregation for the overall gap reinforces
the idea that female and male part-timers are largely located in different
collective agreements. Again when considering full-timers alone the change is
the opposite, the relative effect of occupational segregation having increased
slightly: while the explanatory percentage was 27.9 in 1995 it had risen to
29.1 per cent in 2004. On the other hand, the gender pay gap having fallen
among the full-timers over the same period leads us to conclude even for
their part that, apparently, occupational segregation did not account for any
larger pay gap share in pecuniary terms in 2004 than in 1995.
The FISCO97-classification is clearly sparser14 than the occupational clas-
sifications the Finnish employer organizations use themselves. Hence it can
be assumed that the FISCO97-classification will not be able to differentiate
between all distinct occupations based on separate work tasks. Apparently,
it can be thought that a part of the pay gap effects now linked entirely to age
(not reported in Table 3 but available from the author on request) should be
in fact read into the effects of occupational segregation.15 This suggests that
14”Sparse” occupational classification refers to a classification which includes a relatively
small number of distinct job/occupational titles and, consequently, bundles up with higher
likelihood even such occupations that are, in fact, regarded genuinely as separate in the
labour market.
15If transfers to other better-paying jobs/work tasks are not reflected as corresponding
changes of occupational titles in the occupational classification, then wage increases due
to career development over time will be falsely interpreted as effects of age/tenure.
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the effects of occupational segregation on the gender pay gap (Line 3 in Table
1) might be underestimated. Most likely the reservation concerns the year
1995 sub-sample, as Statistics Finland undertook a revision project in 2001
with the aim of being able to convert more precisely job/occupation titles in
employers’ own denser occupational classifications to FISCO97-occupations.
Thus, there is reason to believe that, in the 2004 calculations, the esti-
mates of the pay gap effects of occupational segregation are no longer under-
estimated - at least to the same degree - as in 1995. At the same time,
by comparing the estimated effects of occupational segregation for the years
1995 and 2004 with each other this would mean that the pay gap effects of
occupational segregation might even have decreased (concerning especially
part-timers) over the observation period 1995-2004. This interpretation is
consistent with the earlier segregation indicator estimates of Laine & Napari
(2008) for the Finnish private sector where the size of occupational segrega-
tion seems slowly have fallen during 1995-2004.
All in all, the effect of occupational segregation on the overall gender
pay gap may have slightly diminished among part-timers while remaining
roughly speaking unaltered among full-timers during the observation period
1995-2004. When comparing the results with earlier research one needs to
take into account that contrary to earlier studies our estimates of the fraction
of the overall pay gap due to occupational segregation control for the effects
of segregation across collective labour agreements. Still our results repeat the
story of earlier research as to attributing a significant fraction of the overall
pay gap to occupational segregation even though defining it more narrowly
than in the literature following the approach pioneered by Groshen (1991).
Finally, however, we complement the overall picture by bringing forth
evidence that men and women being allocated differently across collective
labour agreements is an extra factor behind the gender pay gap. Besides, its
role is far from irrelevant in the context since according to our results it con-
tributes significantly more to the overall gender pay gap than, for example,
firm/establishment segregation does. In fact, among part-timers segregation
by gender across collective agreements seems downright pivotal.
5 Discussion
We have reported new empirical evidence on how different forms of segrega-
tion affected the gender pay gap in the Finnish private sector in 1995 and
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2004. We introduce and apply a new econometric approach naming it the
collective labour agreements classification method (CLAC). The chosen ap-
proach differs from the mainstream studies on the male-female pay gap in a
number of ways.
Especially, in our approach the border line between the distinct forms
of segregation is drawn somewhat differently from the common approach.
The fundamental novelty is a clear-cut separation of occupational, firm and
educational segregations and their pay gap effects from the one due to men
and women being differently distributed across collective labour agreements.
There exists, in our view, a hierarchical difference between these two groups
of segregation. Namely, in a labour market characterised by collective bar-
gaining collective labour agreements form the very basis on how wages are
determined. This means that the way and the extent wage determining fac-
tors, such as, age, experience, education, occupation etc. are being reflected
in a person’s wage depends in the first place on his/her collective agreement.
For example, the size of the (partial) effect determining to which degree a
certain occupation affects personal wages varies from a collective agreement
to another.
Consequently, the key point as regards the definition of occupational seg-
regation and especially the accurate estimation of its gender pay gap effects
is being able to separate occupational segregation from the one due to men
and women being differently distributed across collective labour agreements.
In the main stream analysis the case when a man and a woman have different
occupations is considered as representing occupational segregation indepen-
dently of whether they share the same collective agreement or not. Instead
according to the collective labour agreements classification method we can
talk about ”pure” occupational segregation only if a man and a woman hav-
ing different occupational/job titles simultaneously belong under the same
collective agreement. This is a major adjustment since now the effects of
these two forms of segregation can, for the first time, be effectively differ-
entiated from each other in empirical work. Furthermore, this conclusion
generalizes to concern gender segregation across firms as well and applies
actually to all the forms of segregation, such as, the ones across educational
levels and fields.
Finally, a key difference in our study as to earlier studies is that now the
estimated pay gap effects of occupational segregation are ”purified” from the
pay gap effects of men and women being differently allocated across collective
agreements. Still according to our results occupational segregation - though
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more narrowly defined as in earlier studies - explains a fairly significant pro-
portion of about 20 to 30 percent of the overall gender pay gap. The results
are consistent with earlier studies where occupational segregation is a major
factor behind the overall gender pay gap. Furthermore, we introduce com-
pletely new evidence showing segregation across collective agreements being
far from insignificant as an explanatory factor for the overall pay gap espe-
cially among part-timers and contributing even in the subset of full-timers
clearly more than, for example, firm segregation to the size of the overall
difference in pay.
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Table 1: Forms of segregation and their effect on the aggregate pay gap.
Form of seg-
regation
Formula Interpretation
Occupational
segregation
∑C
c=1
∑Oc
o=2
W¯ fc N
f
c
W¯ fNf
δˆmco
(
Mco
Mc
− FcoFc
) How many log-percent
higher women’s mean wage
would be after eliminating
occupational segregation.
Firm segrega-
tion
∑C
c=1
∑Ec
e=2
W¯ fc N
f
c
W¯ fNf
γˆmce
(
Mce
Mc
− FceFc
) How many log-percent
higher women’s mean wage
would be after eliminating
firm segregation.
Collective
agreement
segregation
ln
{
Wm
W f
}
− logLaspWmf
How many log-percent
higher women’s mean wage
would be after eliminat-
ing collective agreement
segregation.
Notes:
1 Mco
Mc
and FcoFc are proportions of men/women working in occupation o of all the
men/women under collective agreement c.
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Table 3: The Aggregated Gender Pay Gaps and the Proportions Explained by
the Key Background Factors - Collective Agreements Classification Method.
OVERALL PAY DIFFER- Full- and Full-timers
ENCE AND ITS ELEMENTS part-timers only
1995 2004 1995 2004
The overall pay gap
1.
How many percent higher
is men’s average wage
compared to women’s
average wage
25.4% 28.8% 20.1% 18.2%
Key explanatory factors Proportion (%) of the overall gap
(1.) due to the corresp. factor
2.
Agreement segregation:
men over-represented in
better paying collective
agreements
24.4% 42.7% 5.0% 13.2%
3.
Occupational
segregation: within the
same collective agreement
men over-represented in
better paying occupations
23.6% 19.1% 27.9% 29.1%
4.
Firm/establishment
segregation: within the
same collective agreement
men over-represented in
better paying firms
3.1% 1.7% 3.5% 3.8%
5. Segregation effects
together
51.1% 61.8% 36.4% 46.1%
6.
Other effects: within the
same collective agreement
men earn more for other
reasons
48.9% 38.2% 63.6% 53.9%
7. Segregation + other
effects
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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